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Abstract: Following humans' struggles to achieve a better under-
standing of the self throughout major historical periods, the idea of the 
quest for a whole self is once more rekindled in the anxiety-laden 
atmosphere of the twentieth century. However, unlike the previous 
approaches, the twentieth century reflection of the notion of the quest for 
self-realization is paradoxically revealed in a new model of struggle 
which inclines more toward spiritual search. This inward struggle 
manifests itself through connecting the ego to the unconscious world, in 
line with the theories of Freud and Jung.  The similarity which exists 
between Jung's psychic state and the Sufis' mystical world defined by 
Ibn e Arabi, makes it possible to reconsider the seemingly nihilist 
readings of the quest for self-realization of the twentieth century absurd 
thoughts in a positive way. 
 




Following the modern Spiritualist movement blooming in the 
nineteenth century, the new model of struggle for self-realization inclines 
more toward spiritual quest through connecting the ego to the unconscious 
world, in line with the theories of Freud and Jung. This new movement, 
according to Webb (1974), reveals “a revival of traditional occultism,” 
focusing on the flight from the world of consciousness and direct access to 
human inwardness (p. 15). Myers (1903) suggests that this occultist 
tendency takes on a myth-making function that focuses on the idea of the 
“subliminal self” (p. 39) and gives rise to the increasing separation of the 
conscious ego from the individual‟s world of unconscious in the twentieth 
century. In a similar vein, Heidegger‟s notion of “Dasein,” and Jung‟s idea 
of the “Self” exhibit the quasi-mystic aspect of such a spiritual model in the 
new era. 
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The idea of the quest for a whole self is once more rekindled in the 
anxiety-laden atmosphere of the twentieth century. As one of the most 
influential figures of the century anticipating the rise of existentialism, 
Heidegger clearly reveals the relationship between the anxiety of human 
beings and their aspiration for the authentic self. Heidegger‟s specific type 
of Being (Dasein) which literally means „Being-there‟ calls attention to the 
fact that without experiencing an existential loss, there is no authenticity of 
being. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1953) postulates, we have a „Being-
in-the-world‟ Dasein which can exist in two modes, inauthentic and 
authentic (p. 117). According to Heidegger, this „Being-in‟ is an existing 
state for the authentic Being since the anxiety and the fear which exist in 
the world lead the individuals to experience all the elements of the 
inauthentic existence urging them to ask for authenticity.  
Very close to Heidegger‟s idea, Steiner (1970) clarifies the 
relationship between anxiety and the emergence of authentic being. He 
remarks that anxiety is: 
 
that which makes problematic, which makes worthy of our 
questioning our Being-in-the-world. Angst is one of the primary 
instruments through which the ontic character and context of 
everyday existence is made inescapably aware of, is rendered naked 
to, the pressure of the ontological. And, further, Angst is the mark of 
authenticity, of the repudiation of the „theyness‟ (p. 78). 
 
Considering the antithesis of possessing authentic and inauthentic Dasein 
as „oneness‟ and „theyness‟, Heidegger hypothesizes that the state of 
„falling-away‟ or “a cadence into decline” (Verfall) is a positive state where 
the individual feels the necessity to ascend to the authentic Being: 
 
Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as 
an authentic potentiality for Being in its self, and has fallen into the 
world. „Fallenness‟ into the world means an absorption in being with-
one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and 
ambiguity. Through the interpretation of falling, what we have called 
the inauthenticity of Dasein may not be defined more precisely. On 
no account, however, do the terms „inauthentic‟ and „non-authentic‟ 
signify „really not‟, as if in this mode of Being, Dasein were 
altogether to lose its Being (p. 182). 
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Human beings‟ fallenness into the mundane existence is then a 
positive state which makes them aware of their inauthentic self urging them 
to strive for an authentic Being. In other words, to give rise to a sense of the 
uncanny and emptiness which is the prerequisite for the recognition of the 
self-loss, humans must keep such a frenetic state under control by habitual 
everydayness, and talk. Thus the anxiety of this bitter recognition must be 
preserved by the sense of presentness in this fallen condition. Heidegger 
explains such a strategy this way: 
 
When Dasein understands uncanniness in everyday manner, it does 
so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning away, the „not at 
home‟ gets „dimmed down‟. Yet the everydayness of this fleeting 
shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state of mind, belongs to 
Dasein‟s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is 
existential, is never present-at-hand but is itself always in a mode of 
facticial Being-there-that is, in the mode of a state of mind (p. 198). 
 
Heidegger believes that to meet a complete self-fulfilment, anxiety forces 
the human beings towards the freedom that death suggests. Such an 
opportunity changes anxiety to a feeling of certainty which foreshadows 
final attainment of the authentic self. Heidegger finally states: 
 
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in 
every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is 
nothing less than Dasein‟s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the 
possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands 
before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this 
way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This 
ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost 
one (p. 219). 
 
The self-releasing nature of the phenomenal falling, the forlornness, 
anguish and despair of humanity which twentieth-century existentialism 
advocates, can be also positively interpreted under the light of Heidegger‟s 
Dasein‟s Being-in-the-world. In this way, Heidegger‟s paradoxical notion 
of emptiness and fullness is reminiscent of Nietzsche‟s paradox of self-
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forgetfulness and self-liberation in the nineteenth century. This kind of 
negative affirmation which is both manifest in Dionysian self-suspension 
and Heideggerian severe self-reduction and non-relation echoes the 
negative teachings of apophatic theology and mysticism. In a similar way 
that tragic self-destruction is blissfully endured by the Dionysian 
individuals, the idea of death offers freedom from the uncertainty and 
anxiety of the inauthentic being in Heidegger‟s idea. However, while 
Dionysian self-suspension is accomplished through merging of the 
individuals‟ ego with the elements of nature as the source of meaning, the 
transformation of inauthentic Dasein to authentic Being is accomplished 
through the ego‟s own state of loss which mystically turns to 
transcendence. In Heideggerian theory then, self-transcendence takes place 
through dissolution of the ego by putting itself in the process of gradual 
loss, while Dionysian transcendence occurs through the chaotic 
transmutation of the ego to nature. 
While the twentieth-century definition of the Self provided by Jung 
reflects Nietzsche‟s idea of the „Ubermensch‟ and the quest for wholeness, 
Jung‟s approach inclines more towards the spiritual side of dissolution, 
focusing on the transmutation of the ego to the world of unconscious. His 
notion of the Self represents a sustained attempt to elevate the human 
being, an idea he inherited from the previous century. As discussed earlier, 
Nietzsche‟s „Ubermensch‟ emphatically focuses on the Dionysian notion 
of the whole self. In Nietzsche‟s project, individuals are supposed to 
achieve the whole self through uniting with nature so as to be redeemed 
and saved from the moral doctrines of the time which repress their 
instincts. The Dionysian individuals thus promote the “natural body” as 
Nietzsche (1999) remarks in the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (p. 1).  
Nietzsche‟s naturalized individuals who try to attain a higher self 
through taking shelter into nature, intoxication, madness, art, love, 
literature, and blissful endurance of suffering, reflects Nietzsche‟s idea of 
the unification of body and spirit, joy and sorrow, creation and destruction. 
Dionysian individuals, then, are those who are reunited with the essence of 
humanity and whatever is passionate, irrational, and chaotic in themselves. 
They blissfully and tragically demolish the ego to restore themselves to the 
humanizing spirit of nature and “experience an ascent-up” into a high and 
free naturalized self (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 120).  
Jung‟s “Individuation” is the term he applies to describe the 
individuals‟ instinctive search for a whole self in the twentieth century. His 
           VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, DECEMBER 2011: 188-201 
 
192 
image of the whole self as “Mandala”, “ring” or “circle” shows his 
extensive adaptation of Nietzsche‟s Dionysian Eternal Recurrence 
representing the idea of the whole self (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 191). However, 
unlike Nietszche‟s vigorous promotion of the “natural body” through 
passionate unification with natural elements, Jung‟s focal point is more 
spiritual. Since Jung considers God as a unifying guide in the depth of the 
unconscious, his idea of the „Self‟ is more internal and immaterial. As 
Huskinson (2004) observes, Jung maintains that Nietzsche‟s Ubermensch 
promotes the „natural body‟ too vigorously, so that it over-identifies with 
the material and does not adequately support its spiritual opposite, God (p. 
96). Jung‟s „Self‟ is the centre and summation of unconscious, correlating 
more with the metaphysical notion of self awareness symbolized in the 
idea of atman (the immortal aspect of the mortal existence; it is the very 
self, the microcosm which imparts to us divine qualities) in the East. 
Unlike Ubermensch‟s destructive unification with nature, via escapist 
rapture, Jung advocates using one's active imagination as the method by 
which one can gradually bring the unconscious to the surface without either 
destroying or inflating the ego in the process of transcendence.  
Jung‟s idea of active imagination is the development of Freud‟s 
notion about the relationship of dreams with eternal existence. The 
psychology of thought in the Freudian system which focuses on the topics 
of feeling, emotion, and memory already reflects the crucial role of the 
personal unconscious. This way, imagination comes to actualize the 
abstract, outside world followed by the idea of the role of such an 
imaginative actualization.  Freud brings forth a new method of presentation 
for human‟s insight in a different field of human activity.  
Very close to the function dream has in manifesting the absolute, 
fantasy plays its role, according to Rosemary Jackson‟s (1981) Marxist and 
Freudian view, “In expressing desire, fantasy can operate in two ways, it 
can tell us or manifest desire or it can expel desire, when this desire is a 
disturbing element which threatens cultural order and continuity” (p. 17). 
Tolkien (1975) maintains that: “fantasy is a means of setting needs and 
desires free, confirming the validity of their pursuit and fulfillment, 
presenting the recovery of fragmented or lost desires and offering 
consolation” (p. 20). Comparing Nietzsche‟s Dionysian method of self-
realization to that of Jung, I agree with Jackson‟s idea about the double-
edged nature of dream and fantasy. In Nietzsche‟s Dionysian approach of 
the quest, fantasy acts as an agent for creating various manifestations of the 
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wished-for self while in Jung‟s imaginative action it expels any desire and 
exposes the ego to the spiritual world of the unconscious.  
Redefining the notion of the Self, Jung focuses on its ideal potency 
where the Self is actively able to generate images which it should ideally 
become. The unconscious is thus a permanent given that is the main 
transforming agent of the ego. Taking this into account, Jung identifies the 
Self with the traditional religious representations like the Ultimate or 
Absolute. In his radical consideration, the Self is indistinguishable from 
God, Christ, Buddha or Khisr. Jung‟s reified „other‟ within the very depths 
of the unconscious considers the ego as a distinct entity from the subjective 
activity of the individuals. Similar to Hegel‟s idea of the “spirit” discussed 
in the Phenomenology of Mind where he forestalls the alienation of the ego 
through appealing it to its other dimension, in Jung‟s idea of the reified ego, 
finding one‟s authentic self demands the alienation of the ego from the 
Self. In such an intrapsychic affair, personalization of the individuals is an 
internal process negating the conscious dimension of the ego. This 
intrapsychic process considers the ego only as an agent which monitors, 
experiences, and remembers the contents of the dreams in the unconscious 
world. It is through the journey of the ego which the consciousness is 
formed and elevated with the treasures brought from the underworld of the 
unconscious. Here, the Self is also considered as an agent of realizing the 
ideal which is in need of the stimulus of the ego for self-perfection. Parallel 
to the intrapsychic pattern of self-realization which is an internal process, 
there is also an indifference to the world of nature as the source of meaning 
unlike Nietzsche‟s emphasis on union with the natural. In Jung‟s idea of 
individuation, the source of value is within the unconscious world as an 
idealizing agent. 
The psychic state which is produced as the result of interconnection of 
the ideal world of the unconscious and the conscious ego is reminiscent of 
the Sufi mystical world. As Corbin (2007) observes, in the Book of 
Ophanies, the great mystic Ibn Arabi describes “the intermediate supra-
sensory world where the Active Imagination perceives events, figures, 
presences directly, unaided by the senses” (p. 43). Similar to Jung‟s 
intrapsychic affair which is indifferent to the outside world, the process of 
active imagination is also free from the sensual world in mystical revelation 
of the self. The mystic, as Halligan (2002) believes, thus surrenders the ego 
in the state of annihilation which gives him the permission to let go of the 
illusion of separateness and to perceive the unity underlying all life (p. 
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278). According to Halligan “what Jung might call the Collective 
Unconscious, is essentially the realm of the Active Imagination of [the 
Sufi] Ibn Arabi” (p. 277).  
The imaginal world in both mystic and Jungian models links the 
opposite world of matter with spirit through the annihilating space that the 
vision creates. As Jung interprets the entrance of the individuals into the 
meaningful world of the unconscious as a journey, Ibn Arabi‟s Journey to 
the Lord of Power basically concerns the travel of the human beings to the 
world of vision (as cited in Halligan, 2002, p. 277). He also describes the 
state of the intuitive individuals as: “the intuitive person sees in his waking 
state what the sleeper sees in the state of sleep and the deceased after death” 
(p. 278). The recurrent mystical motif of the union of opposites which leads 
the mystics to the manifestation of the ultimate truth is reminiscent of 
Jung‟s psychic experience. Ibn Arabi‟s idea of Sophia aeterna which 
demonstrates the union of the male mystic with God as his beloved is 
reflected in the image Anima in Jung‟s psychic state (p. 285).  
According to the mystical belief of Ibn Arabi, it is in the interface of 
such a union [“interval”] where the intuitive person reaches a sense of self-
fulfilment. Jung similarly approves of such satisfaction by referring to the 
release of psychic energy in the moment of the union of the opposites. The 
sense of fulfilment which the intrapsychic affair produces is according to 
Jung the manifestation of a higher self. Evaluating this transcending 
moment, Steiner (1970) says: “In certain altered states of consciousness . . . 
one finds a subliminal self or subject, an inner figure who is not the ego but 
shows intentionality and will. The ego can enter into dialogue with this 
other subpersonality” (p. 98). Jung‟s psychic space which takes place in the 
total surrender of the will throws light upon his mystic aspect of self-
realization. In other words, the surrender or annihilation of the will which 
occurs in the psychic state, leads to a higher level of realization which 
Corbin refers to as the moment of presence in mystical experience. 
Annotating the mystical approach of Ibn Arabi in his active imagination, 
Corbin (2007) writes: 
 
The mode of presence conferred by the imaginative power . . . is by 
no means an inferior mode or an allusion; it signifies to see directly 
what cannot be seen by the senses, to be a truthful witness. The 
spiritual progression from the state of simple believers to the mystic 
state is accompanied through an increasing capacity for making 
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oneself present to the vision by the imagination . . . progressing from 
mental vision by tipification . . . by way of dream vision . . . to 
verification in the station of imagination witnessing vision [which] . . . 
becomes vision of God by Himself, the heart being the organ, the 
„eye‟ by which God sees Himself (p. 23).  
 
The fact that the mode of presence cannot take place through the senses 
makes the intuitive person annihilate the ego which prepares the ground for 
the appearance of unconscious images during the wakefulness. Through 
annihilating the senses, the individuals cross over the material world and 
are increasingly surrendered to the world of spirit which is transmuted and 
concretized in the shape of visions. Therefore, based on what Jung and the 
mystics believe about annihilating the senses, the phenomenal world is 
turned to be illusory itself very close to the nature of the unconscious 
world. In this regard, along with the twentieth-century idea of the void 
advocated by Camus‟ or Sartre‟s existentialism, the meaningful empty 
space which is produced following the transmutation of the individuals‟ 
consciousness to the spiritual world of the unconscious reveals the quasi-
mystic dissolution of the ego towards attaining the whole self.  
One of the manifestations of this quasi-mystic, nirvana-like search for 
the whole self in the twentieth century is the Theatre of the Absurd. What 
the saintly hermit in the forest replies to Zarathustra demonstrates the 
culmination of the traditional occultism which focuses on the individual‟s 
alienation of the ego through appealing to its other dimension. When 
Zarathustra asks the old man how he passes his time in his solitude, he 
replies: “I make up songs and sing them; and when I make up songs I 
laugh, I weep, and I growl; thus do I praise God” (II. 279). Although 
Zarathustra declines the hermit‟s offer, in private, he speaks to himself this 
way: “Can it be possible! . . .” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 279).  
Following the spiritual nature of the ideas which focus on the 
transmutation of the ego to the unconscious world early in the twentieth 
century, the Absurd Theatre paradoxically reveals symptoms of a quasi-
mystic quest for self-realization. While the existentialistic parallels may be 
informative, the particular richness of the mystical signs in the Absurd 
plays opens opportunities for positive interpretations. Making songs, 
singing, laughing, weeping, and growling exemplify the timid effort of the 
Absurd characters to transmute the ego to the spiritual world of the 
unconscious through expelling the egoistic desires. The hermit‟s seclusion 
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in a similar vein suggests the purposeful attempt of the individuals to 
become unaware of the surrounding world and connect themselves to the 
spiritual world of the unconscious in search of a dimension of the 
spirituality.  
The radical devaluation of language, reliance on dream, fantasy, and 
memory, lack of communication, irrelevancy of speech, and addiction to 
silence are all instruments which take the individuals from the conscious 
world to the spirituality of the unconscious. Inaction is the keynote to the 
whole process of transmutation as it cuts off the relation of the individuals 
from the meaningless void of the surrounding reality. Plunging the 
characters into the passivity of waiting, Godot is the symbol of illusion and 
inaction who takes the characters back into the spiritual world of the 
unconscious in the Absurd Theatre.  
Being a Jungian psychologist, Metman (1960) also asserts that 
“Godot‟s function seems to be to keep his dependents unconscious” (p. 
51). The idea is emphasized in Godot when the characters who are about to 
realize they have been dreaming and must wake up are suddenly faced 
with the arrival of Godot‟s messenger who plunges them again into the 
world of illusion (p. 60). Throughout the whole play, the characters are 
journeying from the conscious world of the ego to the spiritual world of the 
unconscious. The characters‟ persistent devotion in a similar vein paralyzes 
their consciousness which aims to enable the individuals to enter the realm 
of essential being. In some of the absurd plays, the characters are even 
demonstrated to start the play at the level of the unconscious. The 
characters‟ paralysis is reminiscent of Heidegger‟s idea of the necessity of 
recognizing the self-loss through keeping a frenetic state of habitual 
everydayness, and idle talk.  Such an ability is reminiscent of what Beckett 
(1931) calls the substitution of the “boredom of being” to the “suffering of 
being” (p. 8). He implies the attainment of the authentic self through 
paralyzing the individual‟s consciousness: “The suffering of being: that is 
the free play of every faculty. Because the pernicious devotion of habit 
paralyses our attention, drugs those handmaidens of perception whose 
cooperation is not absolutely essential” (p. 9). 
The idea of paralyzing the attention connotes the transmutation of the 
consciousness to the spiritual world of the unconscious. This kind of 
transmutation is remarkably manifest in Beckett‟s allusion to Bram‟s 
painting. He explicitly refers to the relationship between non-relation and 
the idea of fruitful univocity when he writes:  
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If I say that he paints the impossibility of painting, the deprivation of 
relation, of object, of subject, I appear to put him in relation with this 
impossibility, with this deprivation, in front of them. He is inside 
them, is this the same thing? He is them, rather, and they are he (p. 
82). 
 
According to Uhlmann (2006), Beckett‟s illusion clarifies “the notion of 
non-relation” which “necessarily involves the bringing to the light of the 
univocity of Being” (p. 14). He then explains Beckett‟s consideration this 
way: “Once all links are severed paradoxically all runs together becoming 
indivisible” (p. 14). Uhlmann also relates such disjunction to a quasi-
religious experience where the body is emptied of all conscious thought 
and perception. He argues:  
 
The first kind of apprehension (the isolation of a singular object) 
opens the way to the second kind of apprehension (sensation in the 
absence of all choice) admitting all possibility and so having done 
with the possible, renouncing all possible action for: „Our 
representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon 
bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our 
needs, or more generally, for our functions‟ (Bergson, 1991:38). The 
renunciation of this perception, then, involves the abandonment of all 
possible relation, dissolving one‟s own identity in merging with all 
Being (p. 76). 
 
The influence of the idea of non-relation is manifest in all Beckettian 
characters and those represented by Pinter. Paralyzing the conscious ego, 
Pinter‟s characters reach the climactic point of transformation where they 
regressively move from the superficial ego to the preliminary stage of 
selfhood. Begley (2005) takes Pinter‟s Betrayal as an example and explains 
such a psychological movement this way: “This idea is that regression 
allows a return to early life experiences that connect the divided self to its 
underlying truth or origin” (p. 132). In this play, the characters‟ self-
paralyzing experience easily separates them from the conscious world and 
lets them enter the level of the unconscious.  
There is remarkably a close affinity between the process of 
transformation in Pinter‟s characters and those of Beckett. It is 
accomplished through similar devices like the showing up of speech 
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represented in the characters‟ silence and deliberate evasion of 
communication. Begley‟s idea about psychological movement through 
which the divided ego is connected to the underlying origin of all reflects 
Jung‟s quasi-mystic idea of transmutation of the ego to the spiritual world 
of the unconscious.  
Uhlmann (2006) reveals the mystical aspect of such a transmutation 
when he refers to the merging of the finite with the infinite side of the 
individuals. His idea of merging the finite with the infinite is reminiscent of 
Jung‟s quasi-mystic notion of individuation transmuting the consciousness 
to the spiritual unconscious: 
 
In turn, requires a merging again with the plane of immanence, the 
univocity of Being which is Spinoza‟s one substance. This occurs 
through a process of inclusive disjunction whereby the modes are at 
one and the same time finite or individuated and merging with the 
infinite substance within which they are no longer individuated, (that 
is, there is a disjunction through which a mode is individuated, but 
that disjunction is inclusive so that it remains indistinguishable from 
the substance from which everything emerges. Alluding to Beckett‟s 
phrase in Malone Dies, „everything divides …into itself‟, Deleuze 
states: “ The disjunction has become inclusive, everything divides, but 
within itself, and God, who is the ensemble of the possible, 
intermingles with Nothing, of which each thing is a modification (p. 
13). 
 
The twentieth-century experience of transmutation of the ego to the world 
of the unconscious expresses the unending tradition of the quest for the 
authentic self through an inward, inactive approach. The recurrent mingling 
of dream and reality along with the ceaseless mental argument focusing on 
inwardness and immobility terminates the idea of futile preoccupation with 
the false alluring of the outward world and the continuous effort towards 
expelling any desire. This recurrence also prevents the catastrophic failure 
of the questers in the light of a situation that everlastingly repeats itself.  
While Nietzsche‟s Dionysian pattern of the quest passionately asks 
for chaotic dissolution of the ego through ecstatic merging with the spirit of 
nature as the source of meaning, the spiritual transmutation of the ego to 
the world of unconscious demands a persistent inwardness, implying a 
kind of order or spiritual peace, as Clov represents it in Beckett‟s Endgame 
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(1962): “I love order. It‟s my dream.  A world where all would be silent 
and still and each thing in its last place, under the last dust” (p. 57). Clov‟s 
silent world reflects the completely spiritual or quasi-mystic notion which 
emphasizes that there is no need to pursue any other alternative. Such 
stillness signifies the final recognition of the positive nothingness which 
represents itself in Beckett‟s (1987) favorite quotation: “Nothing is more 
real than nothing” (p. 193). 
In other words, as Bataille (2004) reveals, the dissolution of the ego in 
Nietzsche‟s Dionysian rapture (p. 177) ends in a dangerous destruction 
which despite being blissful only foreshadows self-liberation after death. 
The imaginative world and fantasy-laden atmosphere of the nineteenth-
century Dionysian quest is shattered by the phenomenal reality of the 
outside world. The suspension of the ego is transitory as the source of 
meaning is shared between the mind of the questers and nature. On the 
other hand, the individuation of the twentieth century focuses on the 
interrelationship between the conscious ego and the buried layers of the self 
itself as the source of meaning. The quasi-mystic renunciation of the ego 
through its recurrent transmutation to the world of unconscious promises 
the hopeful manifestation of self-realization without any dangerous end. 
The attempt at spiritual transmutation to the unconscious world, which is 
the dominant spirit of the twentieth-century idea of the quest for self-
realization, demonstrates a meaningful emptiness of nirvana leading to the 
manifestation of authenticity without the death of the questers. The Theatre 
of the Absurd is one of the expressions of such a quasi-mystic emptiness 
conveying the idea of self-nullification and self-realization.  
Some might think that the self-nullifying actions of the characters of 
the Absurd Theatre prevent theatre from harboring any tragic sense. 
Referring to what Roche believes about the definition of tragedy and the 
conscious attempts of the absurd dramatic characters to annihilate the ego, 
we can consider the Theatre of the Absurd to be a continuation in the 
developmental process of Western tragedy rather than a deviation from it. 
Defining tragedy based on the notion of the hero‟s greatness, Roche (1998) 
asserts that “the various forms of greatness, which can be viewed 
dialectically, allow us to speak of different types of tragedy” (p. 49). He 
adds that “the initial form we see [is] a tragedy of self-sacrifice. The hero 
does good knowing that she will suffer for it” (p. 49).  
The conscious self-renunciations of the absurd dramatic characters 
lead them to an ongoing substratum of suffering which can be considered 
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to be a kind of self-sacrifice in the quest for greatness. Although based on 
the weakness of the modern dramatic characters in coping with the absurd 
situation, Roche distinguishes between tragedy and the twentieth-century 
drama of suffering, as the characters try to attain their wished-for higher 
self; they are still great and not submissive to the circumstance.  
The fact that self-annihilation and complete withdrawal from the 
allures of the outside world are the only possible choices left for the absurd 
dramatic characters to challenge the finitude of the environment in order to 
achieve the wished-for greatness, makes it possible to consider them as 
great as Oedipus, whose self-imposed blindness at the end of his quest for 
self-realization led him to an inward insight.  
The tentative calmness that the absurd tragic characters feel, either 
during the moments of suffering or after the whole process of suffering, 
once more justifies the type of tragedy which the Theatre of the Absurd can 
suggest. The sense of mild happiness or the internal rejoicing that can be 
recognized in the absurd characters is reminiscent of Schelling‟s notion of 
tragic sacrifice where “precisely at the moment of most sublime suffering 
the tragic hero enters into the most sublime liberation and most absence of 
suffering” (as cited in Roche, 1998, p. 52).  Here, Schelling‟s idea well 
reflects the quasi-mystic nature of the Theatre of the Absurd, where the 
conscious self-renunciation of the characters are reminiscent of the Sufi‟s 
rapturous self-annihilating actions which lead them to attain a higher 
degree of self-realization. The idea is also applicable to the Jungian reading 
of the Theatre of the Absurd where the transmutation of the ego makes the 
individuals enter the spiritual world of the unconscious. The idea also 
matches a Nietzschean interpretation of the Theatre of the Absurd where 
tragic suffering is happily welcomed by the Dionysian individuals to make 
them attain a higher self.  
From another view point, based on Scheler‟s (1991) definition of 
tragedy reflected in “On the tragic,” whatever leads to greatness and allows 
the hero to realize a positive value also engenders suffering (p. 29). The 
idea is reminiscent of Icarus of the Classical mythology whose ascent was 
supposed to give him a sense of a higher self, but the glue that held his 
wings led him to suffering and his final fall. Therefore, in this context, the 
suffering must not necessarily stem from the hero‟s greatness. It can stem 
from the attempt towards greatness.   
Considering either of these suppositions, whether the absurd dramatic 
characters are great themselves because of their heroic self-annihilating 
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attempts or their endeavors towards achieving greatness, based on the 
tradition of the quest for self-realization, the Theatre of the Absurd can be 
considered as a continuation of the process of development in Western 
drama. It might be better to consider it as a specific kind of tragedy in 
twentieth-century plays where the characters take benefit from the only 
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